Volume 32
Issue 3 Summer 2002
Summer 2002

Search and Seizure Law: State v. Cardenas-Alvarez: The
Jurisdictional Reach of State Constitutions - Applying State
Search and Seizure Standards to Federal Agents
Rebecca N. Turner

Recommended Citation
Rebecca N. Turner, Search and Seizure Law: State v. Cardenas-Alvarez: The Jurisdictional Reach of State
Constitutions - Applying State Search and Seizure Standards to Federal Agents, 32 N.M. L. Rev. 531
(2002).
Available at: https://digitalrepository.unm.edu/nmlr/vol32/iss3/11

This Notes and Comments is brought to you for free and open access by The University of New Mexico School of
Law. For more information, please visit the New Mexico Law Review website: www.lawschool.unm.edu/nmlr

SEARCH AND SEIZURE LAW: State v. Cardenas-Alvarez. The
Jurisdictional Reach of State Constitutions-Applying
State Search and Seizure Standards to Federal
Agents
REBECCA N. TURNER*
I. INTRODUCTION
In State v. Cardenas-Alvarez,' the New Mexico Supreme Court again holds that
the state constitution provides greater protection of an individual right to be free of
unreasonable search and seizure than is afforded by the Fourth Amendment of the
United States Constitution.2 This "New Federalist"3 approach to constitutional
interpretation follows a trend that began over a decade ago in New Mexico, which
rejected an interpretation of the state constitution in lock-step with federal law when
claims also arise under New Mexico constitutional law.'
The Cardenas-Alvarezdecision addresses more than the scope of an individual's
protection against unreasonable search and seizure, because its context portends a
shift in the constitutional balance of powers between federal and state governments.'
In effect, the court ruling holds federal agents accountable to the state constitution
even though their actions are within the scope of their federal employment duties
and occur within the confines of federally-controlled border checkpoint stations.6
Arguably, subjecting federal agents to state law that is stricter than federal law
represents a shift in the balance of federal and state powers.
The Cardenas-Alvarez decision sidesteps these significant constitutional issues
by focusing instead on the state's evidentiary rule governing admissibility in state
prosecutions. Upholding the exclusionary rule in this context effectuates the more
expansive protections guaranteed by the New Mexico Constitution. However, by
applying this rule and holding federal agents accountable to stricter state search and
seizure requirements, the Court fails to recognize the inherent limitations of state
constitutions, as established by Article VI of the United States Constitution and
Article 11, Section 1 of the New Mexico Constitution, and thereby violates
supremacy principles.
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On September 6, 1997, at 7:35 PM, federal border patrol agent Hector Arredondo
stopped Candelario Cardenas-Alvarez at a permanent border patrol checkpoint more
than sixty miles north of the Mexican border.' Cardenas-Alvarez was driving a

* Class of 2003, University of New Mexico School of Law. Special thanks to Professor Ruth Kovnat for
the incredible support and assistance provided on this project. Many thanks to Allison Crist and David Pato for their
time and effort, as well as to my husband, Daniel J.Walker, for his advice and support throughout this writing.
I. 2001-NMSC-017, 130 N.M. 386,25 P.3d 225.
2. Id. 15, 130 N.M. at 392,25 P.3d at 231.
3. Jennifer Cutcliffe Juste, Constitutional Law-The Effect of State Constitutional Interpretation on New
Mexico's Civil and Criminal Procedure-State v. Gomez, 28 N.M. L. REv. 355, 357 (1998).
4. State v. Gomez, 122 N.M. 777, 782-83, 932 P.2d 1, 6-7 (1997).
5. 2001-NMSC-017 I 19, 27, 130 N.M. at 394-95, 396, 25 P.3d at 232-33, 235.
6. Id.
7. Id. 1, 130 N.M. at 388, 25 P.3d at 227.
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pickup truck with Mexican license plates.8 He held a resident alien identification
card, which he showed to Agent Arredondo upon request for identification. 9 Further
questioning by the border patrol agent revealed that Cardenas-Alvarez was driving
from El Paso, Texas, to Albuquerque to pick up a vehicle he had recently
purchased."° Cardenas-Alvarez told Agent Arredondo that he had borrowed the
pickup truck from a friend so that he could pick up his new car in Albuquerque."
Agent Arredondo, suspicious of Cardenas-Alvarez's statements, ordered2
Cardenas-Alvarez to travel to a secondary inspection area for further questioning.'
Arredondo later stated that he had considered it suspicious that no one was
accompanying Cardenas-Alvarez to help tow the new car and pickup truck back to
El Paso.13 Additionally, the apparent lack of tow tools in the pickup; the use of a
longer, less popular route to Albuquerque; the late night drive; and the use of a truck
with Mexican license plates even though he was a resident alien were further reasons
for the Agent's initial suspicions. 4
At the secondary inspection area, also operated by the Immigration and
Naturalization Service, Cardenas-Alvarez consented to a vehicle search.'" Agent
Arredondo noted fresh marks on the gasoline tank and asked for and received
Cardenas-Alvarez' s consent to have the truck searched by a canine unit. 6 The search
dog alerted the Agent to the gasoline tank, where an additional internal tank was
discovered. Cardenas-Alvarez was arrested, the tank was later dismantled, and
agents found concealed in the tank eighty-five pounds of marijuana. 7
The case was filed in New Mexico District Court. Cardenas-Alvarez moved to
suppress the evidence of the seized drugs on the ground that Agent Arredondo
lacked reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to detain him beyond the initial
questioning at the first border checkpoint."8 The trial judge denied the motion,
concluding that Cardenas-Alvarez's responses and actions raised reasonable
suspicion."' At trial, a jury found Cardenas-Alvarez guilty of possession of
marijuana with intent to distribute. 20
On appeal, the New Mexico Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, finding
that the extended detention was unlawful under federal Tenth Circuit and New
Mexico case law interpreting the guarantees of the Fourth Amendment of the United
States Constitution.2 ' The court noted that some disagreement existed between Tenth
Circuit and state court decisions on the required standard of review for justifying

8.
9.
10.
i.
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13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
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21.

Id. 2,
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. 3,
Id.
Id.
Id. 4,
Id.
Id.
Id. 5,
Id.
Id.
State v.

130 N.M. at 388, 25 P.3d at 227.

130 N.M. at 388, 25 P.3d at 227.
130 N.M. at 388, 25 P.3d at 227.

130 N.M. at 388-89, 25 P.3d at 227-28.
Cardenas-Alvarez, 128 N.M. 570, 574, 995 P.2d 492, 496 (Ct. App. 2000).
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extending detentions at highway checkpoint stations.2 2 While New Mexico required
"reasonable suspicion," the Tenth Circuit needed only "suspicious circumstances"
to justify prolonging a motorist's detention. 23 Nonetheless, the court did not find
sufficient evidence to meet even the less strict "suspicious circumstances" standard
24
of the Tenth Circuit Court.

The New Mexico Supreme Court granted certiorari and affirmed the result of the
decision by the court of appeals. 25 However, the supreme court found CardenasAlvarez's detention valid under the Fourth Amendment of the United States
Constitution, but invalid under Article II, Section 10 of the New Mexico
Constitution.26 The court, using an interstitial analysis27 to review the constitutional
issues implicated by search and seizure law, first considered whether CardenasAlvarez's right against unlawful search and seizure was protected under the United
States Constitution. It noted that under federal law, specifically Tenth Circuit Court
decisions, Agent Arredondo had acted within the scope of a lawful search and
seizure of Cardenas-Alvarez's pickup truck. 28 Since Cardenas-Alvarez's asserted
right against the search and seizure was not protected under federal law, the New
Mexico Supreme Court next considered whether such a right was protected under
the state constitution.29 The court, affirming earlier decisions, held that state law
provided individuals greater protection against unreasonable search and seizure than
federal law.3 °
While noting the difference between federal and state interpretation of search and
seizure law, the court considered whether there was sufficient reason to justify
diverging from federal precedent.3' The New Mexico Supreme Court determined
that, because of distinctive characteristics of state law relating to border checkpoint
detention, it was justified in diverging from federal precedent. Furthermore, the
court noted that the federal agent's search and seizure of the pickup truck implicated
the state constitution because it led to the discovery of evidence admitted in state
court. 32 The court determined that Agent Arredondo failed to meet New Mexico's
"reasonable suspicion of criminal activity" standard for extended detention
of a
motorist and concluded that all evidence seized from Cardenas-Alvarez's illegal
detention must be suppressed.3 3 With the evidence inadmissible, the supreme court
found no ground to uphold Cardenas-Alvarez's conviction and reversed the
charges.'

22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

Id. at 573, 995 P.2d at 495.
Id. at 574, 995 P.2d at 496.
Id. at 575, 995 P.2d at 497.
2001-NMSC-017 11, 130 N.M. at 388, 25 P.3d at 227.
Id. 15, 130 N.M. at 388-89, 25 P.3d at 228.
See infra section M.D.
2001-NMSC-017 IN8-9, 130 N.M. at 390-91, 25 P.3d at 228-29.

29. Id.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

10, 130 N.M. at 390, 25 P.3d at 230.

Id. 15, 130 N.M. at 390, 25 P.3d at 231.
Id. 1 14, 130 N.M. at 391-92, 25 P.3d at 230.
Id. IN 18-19, 130 N.M. at 393, 25 P.3d at 232-33.
Id. IN 20-22, 25, 130 N.M. at 394-95, P.3d at 233-34.
Id.
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m. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Article II, Section 10 of the New Mexico Constitution provides, "The people shall
be secure in their persons, papers, homes and effects, from unreasonable searches
and seizures."" The New Mexico Supreme Court has found implicit in this
provision "the fundamental notion that every person in this state is entitled to be free
from unwarranted governmental intrusion."36 Traditionally, the New Mexico
Constitution has governed only the state sovereign. The Cardenas-Alvarezdecision
extends this scope and subjects federal agents who conduct searches and seizures
inside the state to Article II, Section 10 of the state constitution. The holding raises
questions as to whether state courts can subject federal agents to state law without
violating federal supremacy principles.
A. Federalismand New FederalismPrinciples
The United States Supreme Court has long recognized the special problems
inherent in federal law enforcement activities in parallel jurisdictions. In Bivens v.
3
Six Unknown Named Agents of FederalBureau of Narcotics," the Court held that
"just as state law may not authorize federal agents to violate the Fourth Amendment,
neither may state law undertake to limit the extent to which federal authority can be
exercised."38 In an earlier decision involving an injunction proceeding to refrain
federal agents from testifying in a state criminal trial,39 the Court stated that if such
injunctions were sanctioned, "[e]very question of procedural due process of
law.. .would invite a flanking movement against the system of State courts by resort
'
to the federal forum, with review if need be to this Court, to determine the issue."
Since Weeks v. United States, 4 the Court has held that evidence obtained from
an unconstitutional search and seizure is inadmissible in federal courts under the
federal exclusionary rule.42 Initially, the Court applied the exclusionary rule only to
evidence seized by federal officers and offered in federal court.43 Evidence obtained
by state officials in violation of the Fourth Amendment was allowed so long as there
was no appearance that state law enforcement "acted under any claim of Federal
authority such as would make the amendment applicable to such unauthorized
seizures."" However, the disparate treatment of federal and state law enforcement
officers in federal courts encouraged the practice of state officials turning over
evidence, seized in contravention of federal law, to federal officials for use in

35. N.M. CONST. art. I, § 10.
36. Cardenas-Alvarez, 2001-NMSC-017 18, 130 N.M. at 393, 25 P.3d at 232 (quoting State v. Gutierrez,
116 N.M. 431, 444, 863 P.2d 1052, 1065 (1993)).
37. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
38. ld. at 395.
39. See Wilson v. Schnettler, 365 U.S. 381 (1961).
40. Id. at 385-386 (quoting Stefanelli v. Minard, 342 U.S. 117, 123-24 (1951)).
41. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
42. See Tom Quigley, Do Silver Platters Have a Place in State-Federal Relations? Using Illegally Obtained
Evidence in Criminal Proceedings, 20 ARIz. ST. LJ. 285 (1988) (recognizing Boyd v. U.S., 116 U.S. 616 (1886),
as the first United States Supreme Court decision recognizing an exclusionary rule).
43. James W. Diehm, New Federalism and Constitutional Criminal Procedure: Are We Repeating the
Mistakes of the Past?, 55 MD. L. REV. 223, 227 (1996).
44. Weeks, 232 U.S. at 398.
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federal court.4 5 The practice was known as the silver platter doctrine4 6 and was
heavily criticized as illogical and irrational. 47 In Elkins v. UnitedStates, 48
the Court
abandoned the dual sovereignty approach in federal courts "because it
no longer
seemed just in light of the individual's right against both governments to
be immune
from unreasonable searches and seizures."49
In Mapp v. Ohio,5 ° the Court interpreted the Fourteenth Amendment to hold
state
officers to the same search and seizure standards that bind federal officers
under the
Fourth Amendment. Thus, the Court eliminated the "silver platter" doctrine
by
requiring uniformity in federal and state search and seizure practices.5
In its
decision, the Court noted that "[tihere is no war between the Constitution.
and
common sense" 52 and that uniformity promotes "[tihe very essence of
a healthy
federalism [that] depends upon the avoidance of needless conflict between
the state
and federal courts. 53
The uniformity achieved by the Mapp Court gave way to states' adoption
of New
Federalism in the 1970s.' New Federalism recognized federal constitutional
guarantees as providing only minimum standards and allowed states to
expand the
protections of individual rights under their state constitutions. The adoption
of
New Federalism led to disparate state interpretation of search and seizure
law.
Differences between state and federal search and seizure law also became
inherent
among states that adopted New Federalism, resurrecting silver platter doctrine
issues
that existed before Mapp, this time in reverse form.56 Instead of federal
courts
applying federal exclusionary rules to keep evidence obtained from illegal
searches
and seizures under federal law out of federal courts, state courts began applying
state
exclusionary rules to suppress evidence obtained by non-state actors in searches
and
seizures that violated state law and were brought in state court. 7 The constitutional
issues raised by states' application of their exclusionary rules on non-state
actors
have been addressed by New Jersey and Oregon courts, each reaching
a different
conclusion as to the proper scope of state constitutions and whether
federal
supremacy principles are implicated.5

45. Quigley, supra note 42, at 306.
46. Id.
47. Diehm, supra note 43, at 231-32.
48.
49.

364 U.S. 206(1960).
Akhil Reed Anrar & Jonathan L. Marcus, Double.Jeopardy Law
After Rodney King, 95 COL. L. REV.
1, 13 (1995).
50. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).

51.
52..
53.
54.

Diehm, supra note 43, at 231.
367 U.S. at 657.
367 U.S. at 657-58 (quoting Elkins, 364 U.S. at 221).
Diehm, supra note 43, at 234. Factors attributed to state adoption of New
Federalism principles were
the desire to assert state sovereignty and the judicial independence
of state
courts, textual and historical differences
of state constitutions, the perception that the United States Supreme
Court was becoming more conservative, and

invitations by the United States Supreme Court to expand upon the protections
provided by the federal Bill of
Rights. Id. at 236-37.
55.

Id. at 234-36.

56. Id. at 247, 257.
57. Id. at 256.
58. Id.
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In State v. Mollica,59 the New Jersey Supreme Court held that "state constitutions
do not control federal action"' since "a state constitution ordinarily governs only
the conduct of the state's own agents or others acting under color of state law."'"
The court noted that because federal agents operate in various states, state courts
have generally treated them as officers from another jurisdiction.62 Since New
Jersey's constitutional protections against unreasonable searches and seizures served
to deter unlawful police conduct,63 the court noted that no state interest could be
achieved in this context "because it is only the conduct of another jurisdiction's
officials that is involved." It further reasoned that applying the state constitution
to "officers of another jurisdiction would disserve the principles of federalism and
comity, without properly advancing legitimate state interests."65
The New Jersey Court qualified its decision by stating that "a vital, significant
condition" for use of federally seized evidence in state court was that "the federal
action deemed lawful under federal standards not be alloyed by any state action or
responsibility."' This condition ensures that the turnover of evidence to state
officials does not occur because of efforts by state law enforcement officers to
circumvent state constitutional requirements.67
Three years later, the Oregon Supreme Court, reviewing the same issue in State
v. Davis,68 held that the state constitution did extend to federal agents. The court
determined that since the exclusionary rule under the Oregon Constitution
"focus[ed] on protecting the individual's rights vis-a-vis the government, not on
deterring or punishing the excessive conduct of any particular governmental actor,
local or otherwise," 69 non-state actors could be held to Oregon's search and seizure
standards.7" It further reasoned that because the exclusionary rule operated to
"vindicate a constitutional right,"'" the state constitution applied whenever the
government used evidence in an Oregon criminal prosecution regardless of "where
or what governmental entity
that evidence was obtained (in-state or out-of-state)
72
(local, state, federal, or out-of-state) obtained it."
While both New Jersey and Oregon courts focused their analysis on the state's
exclusionary rule, the New Jersey court also considered federal supremacy issues
implicated by its decision. This additional analysis was determinative for the New
Jersey court. By recognizing the inherent limitations of state constitutions set by
Article VI, the New Jersey court held that it could not subject federal agents to the

59. 554 A.2d 1315 (N.J. 1989).

1327.
1324.
1327.
1328.

60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id. at
Id. at

67.

WAYNE

1327.
1329.

R. LAFAVE,

SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 1.5(c) (West

3d ed. 1996).
68. 834 P.2d 1008 (Or. 1992).
69. Id. at 1012.
70. Id.
71.

Id.

72. Id.
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New Jersey Constitution. In contrast, the Oregon court's analysis, expanding the
reach of the state's constitution to government officials outside its jurisdiction, was
done without addressing federal supremacy principles. Such disparate treatment of
the appropriate scope of state constitutions by state courts in an era of New
Federalism has yet to be addressed by the United States Supreme Court.
B. FederalSearch and Seizure Law
The federal Bill of Rights was adopted to protect individual rights against
encroachment by the federal government at a time when state governments were
"perceived.. .protectors of individual liberty."74 Federal search and seizure law, as
governed by the Fourth Amendment, requires that searches and seizures be
reasonable; reasonableness being a determination that individualized suspicion of
wrongdoing existed at the time of the search and seizure.75 The Fourth Amendment
also commands a warrant requirement before law enforcement officers can conduct
searches and seizures. 76 These limitations on search and seizure powers serve to
"prevent arbitrary and oppressive interference by enforcement officials with the
privacy and personal security of individuals."' 77
Over the years, the United States Supreme Court carved some exceptions to the
requirement of warrants based on individualized suspicions after the practical
realities of law enforcement made it evident that the general rule hindered law
enforcement officers' abilities to perform their duties.78 An automobile exception
was first made in Carrollv. United States.79 The Supreme Court determined that
warrantless searches of automobiles could be made if there was probable cause that
the vehicle contained contraband. 0 In United States v. Ross, 8 the Court further
expanded the automobile exception by holding that if probable cause did exist, law
enforcement82officers could also conduct searches of closed containers found within
the vehicle.
8 3 the Court considered
In United States v. Martinez-Fuerte,
whether routine
border checkpoint stops could operate without the advanced authorization of a

73. State v. Mollica, 554 A.2d 1315, 1327 (N.J. 1989).
74. Michael Browde, State v. Gomez and the Continuing Conversation Over New Mexico's State
Constitutional Rights Jurisprudence, 28 N.M. L. REv. 387, 402 (1998).
75. City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 37 (2000).
76. See U.S. CONST. amend IV.
77. U.S. v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 554 (1976).
78. Juste, supra note 3, at 369.
79. 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
80. Juste, supra note 3, at 369. Legislative history on the Fourth Amendment was interpreted by the Carroll
Court as recognizing a difference between searching a
store, dwelling house or other structure in respect of which a proper official warrant readily may
be obtained, and a search of a[n]... automobile, for contraband goods, where it is not practicable
to secure a warrant because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction
in which the warrant must be sought.
Id.
81. 456 U.S. 798 (1982).
82. Id.
83. 428 U.S. 543 (1976).
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judicial warrant and still be consistent with the Fourth Amendment. s' The Court held
that vehicle stops at permanent border checkpoints for brief questioning of the
occupants required no suspicion that the vehicle contained illegal aliens, so long as
the detention "lies in appropriate limitations on the scope of the stop."85 The Court
further found that referral of motorists to secondary inspection areas for the purpose
of questioning their citizenship and immigration status was still within the bounds
of the Fourth Amendment.
Before upholding the constitutionality of the program, the Court first considered
the public interest and the Fourth Amendment interest of the individual.86 It
determined that intrusion on motorists at these checkpoints was "sufficiently
minimal."87 At the same time, the public interest was substantially served by the
apprehension of smugglers and illegal aliens,88 identified by the Court as a
"legitimate" purpose for a highway checkpoint program.89 The Court recognized that
border patrol officers "must have wide discretion in selecting the motorists to be
diverted for the brief questioning involved,"' but emphasized that its holding was
confined to permanent checkpoints, stating that "[a]ny further detention must be
based on consent or probable cause."'"
The Tenth Circuit precedents provide more specific guidance about the scope of
permissible questioning at highway checkpoints in the absence of individualized
suspicion. Law enforcement officers can satisfy Fourth Amendment requirements
so long as their questioning is limited to vehicle ownership, cargo, destination, and
travel plans, and reasonably relates to the officer's duty to police the borders to
prevent the smuggling of contraband.92 The Tenth Circuit has also held that border
patrol agents may "question individuals regarding suspicious circumstances, in
addition to citizenship matters, when those individuals are stopped at a permanent
checkpoint."93 The court noted that it was "properly reluctant to interfere" with the
way border patrol agents conducted their questioning of motorists at these
checkpoints since these agents were "specifically trained to look for indicia of
' The
crime, with an emphasis on immigration and customs laws."94
court was willing
to defer to these agents to set the appropriate scope of questioning "so long as their
interrogation bears a reasonable relationship to their unique duties."95

84. Checkpoint stops are "seizures" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Martinez-Fuerte,428
U.S. at 556.
85. Id. at 567.
86. Id.at 555.
87. Id. at 563.
88. Id. at 556-57.
89. Id. at 562.
90. Id. at 563-64.
91. Id. (quoting United States v Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 882 (1975)).
92. United States v. Rascon-Ortiz, 994 F.2d 749, 752 (10th Cir. 1993).
93. United States v. Sanders, 937 F.2d,1495, 1499 (10th Cir. 1991) (quoting United States v. Benitez, 899
F.2d 995, 998 (10th Cir. 1990)).
94. Id. at 1500.
95. Id.
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C. New Mexico Search and Seizure Law
The New Mexico Supreme Court, which traditionally interpTreted the state
constitution in lock-step with the United States Constitution,9 adopted New
Federalism principles in 1976. 9' In State ex rel. Serna v. Hodges, the court declared
the sovereign right to independently scrutinize the state constitution.9" By 1989, the
court interpreted the New Mexico Constitution as according New Mexican
inhabitants with broader protections against unreasonable searches and seizures than
the United States Constitution." State courts have ruled that while officers may
conduct warrantless searches and seizures at highway checkpoints, they are limited
to questioning motorists and other individuals in the vehicle of their citizenship and
to visually inspecting the vehicle. The courts have held that anything beyond this
scope requires reasonable suspicion to justify continued detention.
When evidence from a tainted search and seizure is used in a state prosecution,
the state's exclusionary rule requires its suppression to "effectuate.. .the
constitutional right of the accused to be free from unreasonable search and
seizure. '"' °° In State v. Gutierrez, the New Mexico Supreme Court stated that the
exclusionary rule "imposes the template of the constitution on the entire warrantissuing process.""° In State v. Snyder,02 the New Mexico Court of Appeals
extended the state's exclusionary rule to federal agents when evidence obtained by
them was used in state court.' The court acknowledged that while state law does
not generally govern the conduct of federal agents, the constitution's more
expansive protections to individuals against unreasonable searches and seizures
required additional analysis."° The court noted that the principles served by New
Mexico's exclusionary rule must be evaluated and compared with how those
principles would be accomplished if the evidence were excluded.'°5
D. The InterstitialApproach
While disparity in New Mexican and federal search and seizure law exists,"°6 the
New Mexico Supreme Court's adoption of the interstitial method of state
constitutional interpretation allows for development of independent state
jurisprudence that is both "principled and reasoned."' 7 The interstitial approach,
formally adopted in State v. Gomez,"°a was lauded as reflecting "the modem role of
[the] United States Constitution as the 'basic protector of fundamental liberties,'
96. Hon. Gene E. Franchini, New Mexico IndepemnentAdjudication, 61 ALB. L. REv. 1495 (1998). The New
Mexico Bill of Rights has twenty-four separate provisions not present in the United States Constitution, including
an Equal Rights Amendment and a Victim's Rights Amendment. Id. at 1495.
97. See State ex rel. Sema v. Hodges, 89 N.M. 351, 552 P.2d 787 (1976).
98. Juste, supra note 3, at 361.
99. See Campos v. State, 109 N.M. 211, 784 P.2d 30 (1989); Juste, supra note 3, at 361.
100. State v. Gutierrez, 116 N.M. 431, 446, 863 P.2d 1052, 1066 (1993).
101. Id.
102. 126 N.M. 168, 967 P.2d 843 (Ct. App. 1998).
103. Id. at 170, 967 P.2d at 845.
104. Id. at 171, 967 P.2d at 846.
105. Id. at 172, 967 P.2d at 847.
106. State v. Cardenas-Alvarez, 2001-NMSC-017 9116, 130 N.M. 392, 25 P.3d 225, 231.
107. Browde, supra note 74, at 394-95.
108. 122 N.M. 777,932 P.2d 1 (1997).
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while allowing states the opportunity to supplement the minimum protections
afforded by the United States Constitution.""' 9 It was also seen as advancing the
state's responsibility "to preserve national uniformity in development and
application of fundamental rights guaranteed by our state and federal
constitutions."' "
The interstitial approach requires the state court to first identify federal law and
the extent to which individual rights are protected under the United States
Constitution."' If the right asserted is protected under federal law, the state
constitutional claim is not examined. 1 2 If the right is not protected under federal
law, however, the court reviews whether broader protections exist under the state
constitution. By examining federal law first, the court can bypass state constitutional
examination in cases where extensive and well-articulated federal protections would
otherwise lead to an inevitable result." 3
The New Mexico Supreme Court considers federal law identified under the
interstitial approach as "highly persuasive" and "presumptively correct.""' The
court asserted, however, that such law is not binding on a state court's interpretation
of its constitution if sufficient justification exists to diverge from federal
precedent.' The court identified at least three reasons to diverge from federal law:
flawed federal analysis, structural differences between state and federal government,
or distinctive state characteristics. 6 Additionally, other commentators suggest that
differences in textual language, legislative history, preexisting state law, matters of
particular state interest, state traditions, and public attitudes may also justify
diverging from federal precedent.'
IV. THE COURT'S RATIONALE
A. The Majority Opinion
The New Mexico Supreme Court conducted an interstitial analysis to address the
substantial issue of whether state search and seizure law, which provides broader
protections to motorists than federal law, applied to federal law enforcement
officers. '8 Relying on Tenth Circuit decisions, the court found that federal precedent
allows a routine stop to go beyond questions concerning the motorist's citizenship
or immigration status," 9 so long as questioning is reasonably related to the federal
agent's duties to prevent unauthorized entry into the United States and to avert drug
109. Juste, supra note 3, at 359 (quoting John W. Shaw, Comment, Principled Interpretations of State
Constitutional Law-Why Don't the "Primacy" States Practice What They Preach?, 54 U. PITt. L. REV. 1019
(1993)).
110. Gomez, 122 N.M. at 783, 932 P.2d at 7.
111.

Id.

112. Id.
113. Id.at 782-83, 932 P.2d at 7-8.
114. State v. Cardenas-Alvarez, 2001-NMSC-017 35, 130 N.M. 400,25 P.3d 225,239 (Baca, J., concurring
opinion) (quoting Juste, supra note 3, at 359).
115. See Gomez, 122 N.M. 783, 932 P.2d at 7.
116. Id.
117. See Juste, supra note 3, at 364.
118. Cardenas-Alvarez, 2001-NMSC-017 4HJ1, 6, 130 N.M. at 388, 389, 25 P.3d at 227-28.
119. Id. 9, 130 N.M. at 390, 25 P.3d at 229.
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smuggling. 20 Finding Agent Arredondo's questioning to be reasonably related to
the scope of his duties and further determining that sufficient suspicion existed to
satisfy federal standards for extended detention, the court found no violation of
Cardenas-Alvarez's federal right to be free of an unlawful search and seizure.' 2'
Determining that federal law did not protect Cardenas-Alvarez's asserted claim,
the New Mexico Supreme Court then turned to the state constitution to resolve
122
whether state search and seizure law provided broader protections to motorists.
The Court found that New Mexico precedent clearly established more expansive
protections to individuals against unreasonable search and seizures.'23 Contrary to
federal precedent, detention of a motorist at a border checkpoint ended once
questioning regarding citizenship or immigration status was answered. 24 Further
detention could only be justified if the officer reasonably suspected the motorist of
criminal activity. 2 '
To decide whether there was sufficient justification to diverge from federal
precedent,'2 6 the Court re-articulated the three reasons identified in Gomez v. State:
flawed federal analysis, structural differences between state and federal government,
or distinctive state characteristics. 2 ' After comparing the texts of Article II, Section
10 with the Fourth Amendment and finding them to be essentially the same, the
court placed special significance on New Mexico precedent, which more broadly
interpreted individual protections against unreasonable search and seizure than those
rights guaranteed under the Fourth Amendment. 28 These broader protections were
regarded as sufficiently distinctive in character to justify departure from federal
29
law.1
Departing from federal precedent raised the question of whether stricter state
constitutional search and seizure requirements could be applied to federal border
patrol agents. 3 ' The court noted that it was a "fundamental notion that every person
in this state is entitled to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion"'' and
that there was no mandate in the state constitution that selectively protected3people
2
in New Mexico from state actors but exempted actions by federal officials.
The court reasoned that because federal agents exercised jurisdiction over New
Mexico and possessed authority to subject New Mexicans to searches and seizures,
it was possible that these agents could conduct an unreasonable search and seizure
and be found in violation of protected rights under the New Mexican Constitution.
120. Id. See also United States v. Rascon-Ortiz, 994 F.2d 749, 752 (10th Cir. 1993); United States v. Massie,
65 F.3d 843, 848 (10th Cir. 1995); United States v. Chavira, 9 F.3d 888, 889 (10th Cir. 1993).
121. Cardenas-Alvarez, 2001-NMSC-017 Ig7-10, 130 N.M. at 389-90, 25 P.3d at 228-30.
122. Id. 6, 130 N.M. at 389, 25 P.3d at 228.
123. See id.?g 15-16, 130 N.M. at 392, 25 P.3d at 231.
124. Id. 16, 130 N.M. at 392, 25 P.3d at 231.
125. Id.
126. Id. 14, 130 N.M. at 391-92, 25 P.3dat 230-31.
127. Id.
128. Id. 15, 130 N.M. at 392, 25 P.3d at 231; see also State v. Gomez, 122 N.M. 777, 787, 932 P.2d 1,11
(1997).
129. Cardenas-Alvarez, 2001-NMSC-017 15, 130 N.M. at 392, 25 P.3d at 231.
130. id. 17, 130 N.M. at 392-93, 25 P.3d at 232.
131. Id. 18, 130 N.M. at 392,25 P.3d at 232 (quoting State v. Gutierrez, 116 N.M. 431, 444, 863 P.2d 1052,
1065 (1993)).
132. Id.
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The court stated that when federal agents intrude on motorists' rights protected by
the state constitution and when the State uses evidence seized by federal agents
during these illegal searches and seizures in state courts, then evidence is subject to
the state exclusionary rule.
Acknowledging it had no authority to constrain the activities of federal agents,
the Court stated that "[it] did possess the authority and duty to insulate state courts
' The
from evidence seized in contravention to the New Mexico Constitution."133
majority further noted,
We acknowledge the supremacy of the federal government and encourage
federal agents to continue to enforce the law in as vigilant a manner as the
federal Constitution permits. When such vigilance violates the protections
guaranteed by our state constitution, however, we will not abandon our guard of
those protections in order to accommodate evidence thereby yielded.134
By applying the state's exclusionary rule to evidence seized by federal agents for
use in state prosecutions, the court implicitly found actions by federal agents were
subject to the state constitution. Recognizing that the exclusionary rule requires an
initial finding of a constitutional violation, the court considered whether the
evidence seized by the federal agent was the result of an illegal search and seizure.' 35
Determining that the agent's reasons for prolonging the detention of CardenasAlvarez were insufficient to satisfy New Mexico's search and seizure requirements,
the majority held the agent in violation of the state constitution.136 Since the
exclusionary rule "requires the suppression of the fruits of an unconstitutional search
and seizure," the court ordered the evidence suppressed.'37
B. The Concurrence
Concurring only in the result, Justice Baca and Chief Justice Serna were
concerned that by subjecting federal agents to the state constitution the court was
acting beyond its authority.'38 Justice Baca believed that finding federal agents in
violation of New Mexico's constitution raised New Federalism issues that were
inadequately addressed in the majority's opinion.'39 He remained most concerned
with the expansion of the "state action requirement" of Article II, Section 10, which
now included federal agent activities conducted under federal authority and within
the boundaries of federal border checkpoints."'° Justice Baca further argued that no
federal precedent existed that allowed state constitutional provisions to apply to
federal actions.' 4 '
While Justice Baca acknowledged that New Federalism allowed states to provide
greater protections to individuals than those available under federal law, he noted

133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.

Id. 119, 130 N.M. at 393-94, 25 P.3d at 233.
Id.
Id. 9 17-19, 130 N.M. at 392-94, 25 P.3d at 232-33.
Id. 121, 130 N.M. at 394-95, 25 P.3d at 234.
Id. 122, 130 N.M. at 395, 25 P.3d at 234.
Id. 25, 75, 130 N.M. at 395, 416, 25 P.3d at 234, 255.
Id. 25, 130 N.M. at 395, 25 P.3d at 234.
Id. 26, 130 N.M. at 395-96, 25 P.3d at 235.
Id. 29, 130 N.M. at 397, 25 P.3d at 236-37.
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that Article VI of the United States Constitution prohibited state control of lawful
federal action.'42 He viewed the majority's opinion as not simply promulgating a
rule of evidence, but as creating a state constitutional right that infringed upon
federal sovereignty. 4 3 While the majority expressly stated that it was not its
intention to make such an infringement on federal authority, Justice Baca argued
that, in effect, its ruling achieved just that."'
Attacking the majority as judicially irresponsible for assuming the suppression
of tainted evidence in state court was the only consequence that would arise from
its ruling, Justice Baca opined that the decision would have a much broader effect. 45
He considered the United States Supreme Court holding in Bivens,'46 which allowed
individuals to sue federal agents to recover money damages for injuries suffered by
federal agent violations of the Fourth Amendment even in the absence of statutory
authority.'47 Justice Baca noted that the majority's ruling could lead to a similar civil
remedy afforded to individuals whose state constitutional rights are violated by
federal agents. 4"
Chief Justice Serna also questioned whether the Court had the authority to deem
a search conducted by federal agents at a federal checkpoint, for federal purposes,
and in compliance with federal law illegal under the state constitution. "' His
primary concern was that there was insufficient state action to implicate the New
Mexico Constitution. 5 ' Since Agent Arredondo was acting under federal authority,
the court was obligated to defer to that authority so long as it was in compliance
with the United States Constitution.'' He argued that to not give deference to
federal law would implicate serious practical consequences.' 52
Chief Justice Serna noted that the net effect of imposing stricter requirements on
federal agents would cause routine prosecution of New Mexican citizens in federal
courts instead of state courts, rendering ineffective the added protections of the
state's constitution.' 53 He believed that prosecutions in federal court would
potentially subject individuals to more severe sanctions and counter the majority's
attempts to provide further protections to New Mexican citizens and residents. 54 He
also believed that it would have the added disastrous effect of encouraging federal
officers to violate the state constitution. 15
Chief Justice Serna acknowledged the role of the state's exclusionary rule in
suppressing any evidence that resulted from an actual unlawful search in violation
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of the rights of one accused.' 56 He was concerned, however, that if federal
supremacy preempts the Court from applying state constitutional standards to
federal agents, there would be no unlawful governmental conduct to redress through
the exclusionary rule since the agent would have stayed within federal law, as
determined by the majority.'57
V. ANALYSIS
The New Mexico Supreme Court's decision to suppress evidence because it
derived from an illegal search and seizure relies on the essential premise that the
state constitution applies to federal agents.' The majority reasoned that nothing in
the text of Article II, Section 10 of the New Mexico Constitution or in its
jurisprudence interpreting the constitutional clause mandated that it "selectively
protect New Mexico's inhabitants from intrusions committed by state but not federal
actors."' 59 By subjecting federal agents to this provision, however, the majority
extends the jurisdictional reach of the New Mexico Constitution to federal action in
violation of federal supremacy principles.
The court extends Article II, Section 10 to federal agents by finding sufficient
state action "in the federal agent's prolonged detention of Defendant" to subject it
to state constitutional requirements for purposes of determining the admissibility of
evidence in state courts. 60 The majority argues that limiting the constitutional
provision to state government actors would be inappropriate. 6' The Court further
reasons that because federal agents exercise jurisdiction over New Mexicans and
possess the authority to subject them to searches and seizures, these agents are also
capable of committing "unwarranted governmental intrusion" against which the
state constitution protects and the exclusionary rule effectuates.'62
By treating the issue as an evidentiary question, while downplaying the
substantive impact of its ruling on federal agents,'63 the majority sidesteps critical
constitutional issues necessary to its analysis. While initially acknowledging federal
supremacy principles," 4 the court holds that state courts will not abandon state
65
constitutional protections to accommodate evidence seized by federal agents.
Irrespective of an existing agency relationship with local or state law enforcement,
the Cardenas-Alvarez court subjects federal agents to the state constitution because
these agents conduct searches and seizures within state boundaries and have the
capacity of committing state search and seizure violations. The majority makes this

156. Id. 77, 130 N.M. at 417, 25 P.3d at 256.
157. Id. 80, 130 N.M. at 417-18, 25 P.3d at 256-57. Chief Justice Serna argued in his concurring opinion
that the majority erred in finding the federal agent's search and seizure legal under federal law. He believed that
Tenth Circuit precedent, interpreting the types of questions federal agents could ask motorists at permanent
checkpoints, exceeded the allowable scope set by the United States Supreme Court. See id. ?g 58-74, 130 N.M. at
410-16, 25 P.3d at 249-55.
158. Id. 4N 17-19, 130 N.M. at 392-94, 25 P.3d at 232-33.
159. Id. 18, 130 N.M. at 393, 25 P.3d at 232.
160. Id. 19, 130 N.M. at 393-94, 25 P.3d at 233.
161. Id. 18, 130 N.M. at 393, 25 P.3d at 232.
162. Id.; see also N.M. CONST. art f1,§ 10.
163. See Cardenas-Alvarez,2001-NMSC-017 19, 130 N.M. at 393-94, 25 P.3d at 232.
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determination in the absence of federal precedent allowing state constitutional
provisions to apply to federal actions."6
The Cardenas-Alvarez decision redraws the jurisdictional reach of state
constitutions beyond the limits set by Article VI without establishing how it has the
power to do so. While the majority acknowledged that it does not have "the
authority to constrain the activities of federal agents," it did claim the authority to
insulate state courts from evidence seized in violation of the state constitution. The
court's focus on the state's exclusionary rule is an important step towards
identifying whether legitimate state interests are served by its use; however, the
analysis does not go far enough and seems to preclude consideration of critical
constitutional issues.
The purpose behind New Mexico's exclusionary rule, which differs from the
purposes served by other state and federal exclusionary rules,167 appears to distract
the Majority from addressing the key question: whether suppression of evidence that
is seized by federal agents and used in state court is an appropriate application of the
state constitution. Unlike federal and other state search and seizure exclusionary
rules, which serve to deter law enforcement officers from committing search and
seizure violations or to maintain judicial integrity, 6 ' New Mexico's exclusionary
rule seeks to "effectuate the constitutional right to be free from unreasonable search
and seizure," and "is of constitutional magnitude." 69 The different public policy
interests served by New Mexico's exclusionary rule permit the court to establish a
personal right to exclusion that carries out the defendant's state constitutional right
7
"to the same extent as if the government's officers had stayed within the law."'O
The constitutional dimension of the state's exclusionary rule allowed the Majority
to justify its application to evidence seized by federal agents who commit
"unwarranted governmental intrusion."''
The majority's focus on the exclusionary rule, irrespective of the public policy
interests served by the state's exclusionary rule, is misplaced. Before exclusionary
rule considerations become relevant, the Court must first determine the legality of
the federal agent's search and seizure since a finding of a constitutional violation is
"a necessary ingredient to the imposition of the exclusionary rule."' 72 However,
determining whether a search and seizure is legal or illegal requires an initial
consideration of the applicable laws and the jurisdictional reach of the state
constitution. 73 The majority found "no mandate" in the state constitution or in its
jurisprudence to exclude federal agents from state constitutional search and seizure

166. See id. 29, 130 N.M. at 397-98, 25 P.3d at 236 (Baca, J., concurring).
167. State v. Gutierrez, 116 N.M. 431, 436-46, 863 P.2d 1052, 1056-66 (1993).
168. Id. at 438, 863 P.2d at 1059; see also Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428,441 (2000) (holding that
the Miranda exclusionary rule is of constitutional dimension and that unwarned interrogation under the Fifth
Amendment is different from unreasonable searches under the Fourth Amendment); Barry Latzer, The New Judicial
Federalism and Criminal Justice: Two Problems and a Response, 22 RUTGERS LJ. 863, 875 (1991).
169. Gutierrez, 116 N.M. at 445, 863 P.2d at 1066.
170. Id. at 446, 863 P.2d at 1067.
171. Cardenas-Alvarez, 2001-NMSC-017 18, 130 N.M. at 393, 25 P.3d at 232.
172. Latzer, supra note 168, at 877.
173. Id. at 877-80.
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standards, thereby establishing that the state constitution applies to evidence seized
by federal agents.'74
Dismissing notions of federal supremacy violations by noting its decision would
not affect federal activities and by acknowledging it did not have the authority to
constrain those activities,"7 the majority's analysis still falls short of reconciling
Article VI implications of subjecting federal agents to the state constitution when
those agents are in conformity with federal law. Instead, the court justified extending
the state constitution to federal agents because legitimate state interests were
served.' 76 Under such an analysis; the purpose of the state's exclusionary rule
appears determinative for the majority as to whether the state constitution can apply
to federal agents.' 77 By not fully considering the federal supremacy issues implicated
by its decision, the New Mexico Supreme Court goes the way of the Davis court in
Oregon,7 instead of following the Mollica court in New Jersey,' and fails to
acknowledge the inherent jurisdictional limitations of the application of state
constitutions on federal agents. 8 '
VI. IMPLICATIONS
While Cardenas-Alvarez further develops New Mexico's constitutional
jurisprudence and continues the trend of according greater individual protections to
its inhabitants than is required under the United States Constitution,' 8 ' the decision
exceeds the inherent boundaries of New Federalism, which is set by Article VI of
the United States Constitution and Article II, Section 1 of the New Mexico
Constitution."' If federal supremacy principles do not provide the outer limits of
state constitutional interpretation, it remains unclear what does. The majority fails
to provide an answer because it clearly did not believe that its decision implicated
any Article VI violations.'83
The court reasoned that its decision will not "affect" prosecutions in federal court
"4or otherwise circumscribe federal activities within our borders." Its argument seems
to be a matter of degree based on its construct of federal and state authority, a
construct on which the majority provides little guidance." The federal agent was
acting within the scope of his duties, in compliance with federal law, and at a border
' While it seems clear
checkpoint completely controlled by the federal government. 85
that the federal agent was operating under federal authority, the majority found that
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the agent's actions were sufficient to trigger application of the state constitution,
thus bringing the agent under state authority. 86
,
Unfortunately, even application of the state's exclusionary rule in
CardenasAlvarez affects federal agents beyond that which the majority allowed." 7
Since an
exclusionary rule analysis requires a finding of an illegal search and
seizure, the
majority opens the door for a civil remedy to individuals whose state
constitutional
rights are violated.' 88 Meanwhile, the practical effect of subjecting federal
agents to
stricter state requirements for searches and seizures may be the
increased
prosecution of New Mexican inhabitants in federal courts.'89 If this occurs,
the more
expansive individual protections accorded by the state constitution
become
inconsequential. '°
VII. CONCLUSION
The Cardenas-Alvarezdecision significantly shifts the balance of powers
between
federal and state governments; yet by focusing analysis on the exclusionary
rule, the
court sidesteps these important constitutional issues without recognizing
the full
implications of its decision. While continued development of
the state's
constitutional jurisprudence is critical, the court must recognize
the inherent
limitations of the interpretive scope of the New Mexico Constitution.
New Federalism challenges the boundaries between federal and state
authority
in ways that can upset the federalist structure of the United States Constitution.
The
New Mexico Supreme Court must uphold its responsibility "to preserve
national
uniformity in development and application of fundamental rights guaranteed
by our
state and federal constitutions, ' as proscribed by its earlier precedent.
This can be
done without sacrificing important state constitutional protections of
New Mexican
inhabitants. Applying federal search and seizure standards in state
courts where
prosecutors use evidence obtained from federal agents who act within
the confines
of federal law ensures that the state will operate within the bounds
of federal
supremacy principles. 92 Additionally, by requiring that no agency relationship
exist
between federal and state law enforcement officers, state and local officials
may
be
conditioned against making efforts to bypass stricter state constitutional
requirements through the use of evidence derived by federal agents.'a
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